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States’ Stances on Public Interest Standing 
M. RYAN HARMANIS 
Standing requires a party to have a sufficient stake in a controversy before it 
can bring a lawsuit. The United States Constitution limits standing in federal 
courts to “cases” and “controversies,” requiring parties to have suffered an 
actual, concrete injury. State courts, unbound by the Federal Constitution, 
sometimes grant “public interest standing” to parties who have not suffered 
any actual injury. In those cases, courts grant standing in the name of the 
“public interest,” or when they raise important constitutional issues. This Note 
explains and analyzes public interest standing, concluding that its underlying 
rationales are insufficient to warrant bypassing standing’s requirement of an 
actual injury. State courts should instead define a clear standing doctrine and 
limit the use of public interest standing. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Same-sex couples everywhere rejoiced on June 26, 2013, when the 
Supreme Court declared part of the federal Defense of Marriage Act 
unconstitutional.1 That same day, the Court also dismissed a lawsuit regarding 
California’s Proposition 8 gay marriage ban.2 While this was a huge victory for 
same-sex couples in California, the Supreme Court declined to directly address 
the constitutionality of state same-sex marriage bans under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Instead, the Court dismissed the case because the petitioners, 
proponents of Proposition 8, lacked standing in federal court.3 While many 
believe the Supreme Court simply did not want to address same-sex marriage 
head on,4 the decision in Hollingsworth v. Perry is grounded in one of the oldest 
concepts of the judiciary: standing. 
                                                                                                                       
 1 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2675−76 (2013). 
 2 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2667‒68 (2013). 
 3 Id. at 2668. The Proposition 8 proponents successfully intervened in the case because 
California officials, including the governor, attorney general, and various other state and 
local officials charged with enforcing California’s marriage laws, refused to defend the law 
or appeal the lower court’s decision. Id. at 2660. 
 4 See, e.g., Todd Noelle, Hollingsworth v. Perry: Taking a Stand on Standing in the 
California Prop 8 Marriage Equality Case, OUTLAW (June 30, 2013), http://sites.duke.edu 
/outlaw/2013/06/30/hollingsworth-v-perry-taking-a-stand-on-standing-in-the-california-
prop-8-marriage-equality-case-2/, archived at http://perma.cc/KL2S-DREQ (characterizing 
the decision as ending the Supreme Court session “with a whimper,” with the Court “seen to 
have ‘punted’ on the issue using arcane procedural grounds”); Jillian T. Weiss, The 
Hollingsworth v. Perry Decision Explained, BILERICO PROJECT (June 27, 2013, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.bilerico.com/2013/06/the_hollingsworth_v_perry_decision_explained.php, 
archived at http://perma.cc/LP7U-7Y4G (“[T]he Supreme Court really didn’t want to have 
to decide the issues raised [in Hollingsworth v. Perry], and had to engage in some serious 
mental gymnastics to find a way to kick it out of court.”).  
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Standing, in layman’s terms, answers the question of who should have 
access to the judicial system.5 As defined by Black’s Law Dictionary, standing 
is “[a] party’s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty 
or right.”6 The Supreme Court has explained that the concept of standing 
addresses whether “a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable 
controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy.”7 Accordingly, 
both state and federal courts include standing as one of the requirements of 
justiciability.8  
In the federal court system, standing is founded on the “case or 
controversy” requirement of Article III of the Constitution.9 Accordingly, 
federal courts confer standing only upon those parties who have a “concrete and 
particularized” injury10 and completely reject standing based upon a generalized 
injury.11 To that end, the Proposition 8 proponents were prevented from 
appealing in federal court because they suffered no particularized or concrete 
injury.12  
Instead of identifying a particularized injury, the proponents of Proposition 
8 argued that the State of California grants individuals standing “to appear and 
assert the State’s interest” in the validity of Proposition 8 when the State refuses 
to do so.13 This argument can be traced to another view of standing, different 
from the Supreme Court’s interpretation, where parties are permitted to bring 
                                                                                                                       
 5 See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. 
REV. 275, 276 (2008). 
 6 Standing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1536 (9th ed. 2009). 
 7 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972). See infra Part IV for various state 
definitions of standing. 
 8 Justiciability encompasses a number of doctrines that determine whether the court 
system will hear or dismiss a case. See Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 
TEX. L. REV. 73, 76–77 (2007) (discussing how Article III of the Constitution “impose[s] a 
constellation of constraints known collectively as doctrines of justiciability”). 
 9 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 10 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citing Allen v. Wright, 
468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984)). 
 11 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2662 (2013) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 
573–74) (“We have repeatedly held that such a ‘generalized grievance,’ no matter how 
sincere, is insufficient to confer standing. A litigant ‘raising only a generally available 
grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in 
proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and 
tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III case or 
controversy.”). 
 12 See id. at 2663. 
 13 The proponents of Proposition 8 put forth a number of arguments in support of 
standing, including statutory standing, associational standing, and representational standing. 
Id. at 2662–67. While these forms of standing are beyond the scope of this Note, the 
Supreme Court rejected each in turn and addressed the question of whether “a private party 
[may] defend the constitutionality of a state statute” without any personalized injury. Id. at 
2668. The overarching theme of the Court’s opinion, therefore, was a firm rejection of 
public interest standing in the federal court system. See generally id.  
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lawsuits in the name of the “public interest.”14 This form of standing is 
commonly referred to as “public interest standing.”15 
Adhering to principles of federalism, individual state court systems are not 
bound by the United States Constitution or the “case or controversy” 
requirement in deciding whether to confer standing upon a party.16 Therefore, 
public interest standing has been used for decades in various state courts17 
despite the Supreme Court of the United States’ consistent rejection of the 
doctrine.18 While some states use a standing doctrine similar or identical to the 
federal court system,19 numerous others allow lawsuits in the public interest or 
for cases involving issues of great constitutional importance.20 The common 
thread of these varying forms of public interest standing in state courts is the 
recognition of the public value of the lawsuit by the ruling court.21  
Although this Note does not attempt to argue that public interest standing 
has no place in state court systems, it advocates a limited approach to public 
interest standing that is more consistent with the rationale underlying the federal 
treatment of standing. The focus of this Note is the “vastly understudied”22 
public interest standing models developed in state court systems.23 This Note 
                                                                                                                       
 14 See, e.g., Save the Plastic Bag Coal. v. City of Manhattan Beach, 254 P.3d 1005, 
1011‒12 (Cal. 2011) (“[W]here the question is one of public right and the object . . . is to 
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the [plaintiff] need not show that he has any legal 
or special interest in the result, . . . [w]e refer to this variety of standing as public interest 
standing.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 15 Public interest standing is also referred to as “public action,” “public duty,” “public 
importance,” “public right,” or “public significance” standing. See, e.g., id. (“public 
right/public duty exception”); State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 
N.E.2d 1062, 1079 (Ohio 1999) (“public action”); Baxley v. State, 958 P.2d 422, 428 
(Alaska 1998) (citizen-taxpayer standing conferred in cases of “public significance”); State 
ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11, 17–18 (N.M. 1995) (“public importance doctrine”). 
For purposes of this Note, the doctrine will be consistently referred to as “public interest 
standing.” 
 16 See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“We have recognized often 
that the constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts 
are not bound by the limitations of a case or controversy or other federal rules of 
justiciability . . . .”); see also Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667. 
 17 See infra Part IV. 
 18 See infra Part II.B. 
 19 See infra Appendix, Table 1. 
 20 This Note is exclusively concerned with the concept of public interest standing. As 
such, other alternative forms of standing, such as taxpayer standing, are beyond its scope and 
examined fully elsewhere. See sources cited infra note 134. 
 21 John DiManno, Note, Beyond Taxpayers’ Suits: Public Interest Standing in the 
States, 41 CONN. L. REV. 639, 644 (2008) (“In these cases, it is often not necessary for a 
litigant to show that his or her interest is protected by some positive law, but rather it is 
sufficient that the interest he or she represents is recognized as a public value by the court.”). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Indeed, the literature on standing is heavily focused on federal standing 
requirements. See, e.g., Hessick, supra note 5, at 276–78 (criticizing the use of the standing 
doctrine and the “injury-in-fact” requirement in private rights cases); Evan Tsen Lee & 
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provides an intensive case study that investigates whether and to what extent 
each state allows public interest standing.24 Additionally, it critically evaluates 
the reasoning underlying the various forms of public interest standing.25 
Part II provides an analysis of federal standing requirements, particularly 
the case-or-controversy requirement, to establish the arguments supporting a 
limited standing doctrine. Part III discusses the concept of public interest 
standing, exploring the inapplicability of the federal case-or-controversy 
requirement in state courts as well as policy reasons that could support a more 
expanded view of standing. Part IV provides the results of an examination of 
the standing doctrine in each state to identify the major frameworks (and 
underlying rationales) employed to confer public interest standing; it then 
provides a critical analysis that requires the rejection of the majority of these 
rationales. Finally, Part V proposes a limited view of public interest standing in 
the states, highlighting the necessity of a clear public interest standing doctrine 
and advocating the use of a very limited view of public interest standing. 
II. PUBLIC INTEREST STANDING (OR LACK THEREOF) IN FEDERAL COURTS 
 “Lawyers will sue anyone for anything.” Every attorney (and law student) 
has heard endless variations of this statement—generally leveled as an 
accusation—as one of the multitude of complaints aimed at the legal profession. 
It is a common media narrative, brought forth regularly when a lawsuit seems 
speculative or contrived, or when the party bringing the lawsuit is particularly 
unsympathetic.26 Often, public sentiment is not far from the truth, as stories of 
frivolous lawsuits are commonplace.27 
                                                                                                                       
Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 169, 
175 (2012) (analyzing the federal standing doctrine where Congress has explicitly relaxed 
standing requirements in “procedural rights” cases); Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the 
Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131, 1132–35 (2009) (identifying and explaining 
past instances where the Supreme Court relaxed standing requirements in cases of the public 
interest). And, to the extent research has turned to standing in state courts, the majority of 
the literature examines systems in specific states or advocates extending public interest 
standing to very specific areas of the law. See, e.g., Gregory Bradford, Simplifying State 
Standing: The Role of Sovereign Interests in Future Climate Litigation, 52 B.C. L. REV. 
1065, 1096–1100 (2011); Kenneth Charette, Standing Alone?: The Michigan Supreme Court, 
the Lansing Decision, and the Liberalization of the Standing Doctrine, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 
199, 205–07 (2011) (examining relaxed standing requirements in Michigan); DiManno, 
supra note 21, at 665–77 (examining public interest standing in Alaska, New Mexico, Ohio, 
and Utah). 
 24 See infra Appendix, Table 1. 
 25 See infra Part IV. 
 26 For example, a pimp recently brought an action against Nike alleging that the 
company was liable for failing to provide clear warning that shoes made by the company 
could be classified as a “deadly weapon” after he was charged for beating a man with his 
shoes. Aimee Green, Portland Pimp Sues Nike for $100 Million for Lack of Warning Label 
After Beating Victim with Jordans, OREGONIAN, http://www.oregonlive.com/portland 
/index.ssf/2014/01/nike_sued_by_portland_pimp_for.html (last updated Jan. 13, 2014, 3:07 
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The general result in these situations is public outrage, first at the plaintiff 
but quickly turning to the “greedy” attorneys willing to file these lawsuits.28 
The underlying sentiment is that some things should be decided by the court 
system, while others should not. Although this usually manifests itself in the 
general public through notions of fairness, the debate as to what issues the legal 
system can (and should) decide is one that the United States Supreme Court has 
addressed regularly for decades.  
A. Standing in Federal Courts and the Case-or-Controversy 
Requirement 
Standing, as a threshold question of justiciability, addresses “whether the 
litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of 
particular issues.”29 Federal courts are restricted by the United States 
Constitution to hearing only those claims constituting a “case” or 
“controversy.”30 This prevents federal courts from adjudicating any and all 
disputes; instead, they can only adjudicate those “historically viewed as capable 
                                                                                                                       
PM), archived at http://perma.cc/TJ28-9W4X. Elsewhere, a California Little League 
baseball coach sued one of his fourteen-year-old players after the player threw his helmet in 
the air to celebrate a game-winning run, only for the helmet to strike the coach and 
(allegedly) sever his Achilles tendon. Ben Rohrbach, Coach Suing 14-year-old over Little 
League Baseball Celebration, YAHOO! SPORTS (Jan. 15, 2014, 3:41 PM), 
http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/highschool-prep-rally/coach-suing-14-old-over-little-league-
baseball-204100538.html, archived at http://perma.cc/S82H-AAUN. 
 27 See, e.g., Top Ten Most Ridiculous Lawsuits of 2012, FACES OF LAWSUIT ABUSE, 
http://www.facesoflawsuitabuse.org/2012/12/top-ten-most-ridiculous-lawsuits-of-2012/ (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/H645-7S4S.  
 28 See Chris Jones, Blame Predatory Attorneys, Not ADA, TIMES-STANDARD, 
http://www.times-standard.com/guest_opinion/ci_24776139/blame-predatory-attorneys-not-
ada (last updated Dec. 22, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/96JA-ZXUG (“Businesses 
should be not [sic] forced to close because of frivolous lawsuits . . . . Attorneys who prey on 
small businesses are predators. They have no desire to fix the problems. It seems that they 
are just looking for a quick buck resulting in small businesses [that are] already struggling, 
being forced to close.”); Jonathan Pollard, Frivolous (Trade Secrets) Lawsuits and Greedy 
(Big Firm) Plaintiff’s Lawyers: A Recent Case from Minnesota, NON-COMPETE BLOG (Nov. 
13, 2013), http://thenoncompeteblog.com/2013/11/13/frivilous-trade-secrets-lawsuits-and-
greedy-big-firm-plaintiffs-lawyers-a-recent-case-from-minnesota/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/H7H9-9DQT (“I’m not singling out this one case, this one plaintiff, or this 
one [law] firm. This is widespread.”). But see Leigh Jones, “Hot Coffee” Shows Other Side 
of “Frivolous” Lawsuits, REUTERS (June 27, 2011, 1:47 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article 
/2011/06/27/us-hotcoffee-idUSTRE75Q54320110627, archived at http://perma.cc/47BT-
VQXE. 
 29 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). The Supreme Court has gone so far as to 
suggest standing is “the most important of these doctrines.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 
750 (1984). 
 30 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013). 
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of resolution through the judicial process.”31 In essence, standing is “the key 
that opens access to the federal courts.”32 
The basic tenets of traditional standing are well settled in federal courts.33 
Article III of the Constitution imposes three requirements upon a party before 
they are adjudged to have standing: (1) they must have suffered an “injury in 
fact”;34 (2) the injury must be fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendant; 
and (3) the injury is likely35 to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.36 
In every case, the plaintiff bears the burden of meeting these requirements 
before the court is permitted to reach the merits of the case.37 Where the 
plaintiff fails to carry this burden, federal courts must dismiss the case.38 The 
requirement most often failed, and the one public interest standing nullifies, is 
the “injury in fact.”39 Despite consistent attempts to relax federal standing 
requirements and numerous opportunities for the Supreme Court to do so, the 
Court has continuously rejected public interest standing. 
                                                                                                                       
 31 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968); see Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 
(1986) (“The presence of a disagreement, however sharp and acrimonious it may be, is 
insufficient by itself to meet Art. III’s requirements.”). 
 32 James W. Doggett, Note, “Trickle Down” Constitutional Interpretation: Should 
Federal Limits on Legislative Conferral of Standing Be Imported into State Constitutional 
Law?, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 842 (2008). 
 33 Compare Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. 2652 at 2668 (articulating standing requirements 
in 2013), with Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (articulating standing requirements in 1982). 
 34 This requires that the injury be (1) “concrete and particularized” and (2) “actual or 
imminent,” rather than “conjectural or hypothetical.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 
Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000). 
 35 It must be “likely” as opposed to “speculative” that a favorable decision will provide 
redress for the injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); Simon v. E. 
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 42−43 (1976). 
 36 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. 
 37 Id. at 561 (“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing 
these elements [of standing].”); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (noting that 
“standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff’s contention”) (citing Flast v. 
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968)). 
 38 See, e.g., Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668 (dismissing case for lack of standing). 
Moreover, these requirements must be met throughout all stages of litigation. Already, LLC 
v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 726 (2013); see also Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 
520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997) (confirming that standing requirements “must be met by persons 
seeking appellate review, just as it must be met by persons appearing in courts of first 
instance”). Accordingly, in Hollingsworth the petitioners were granted statutory standing by 
the State of California in federal district court but lacked any further standing at the appellate 
level based on the absence of a particularized injury. 133 S. Ct. at 2659 (“Because we find 
that petitioners do not have standing, we have no authority to decide this case on the merits, 
and neither did the Ninth Circuit.”). 
 39 See infra Part IV. 
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B. The Supreme Court’s Rejection of Public Interest Standing 
The Supreme Court of the United States has been emphatic and consistent 
in its rejection of public interest standing.40 The Court generally rejects cases 
requesting the conferral of public interest standing by finding that the plaintiff 
failed to establish an injury-in-fact.41 This may mean the absence of any injury 
at all42 or, more often, the absence of any injury distinct from injury to the 
general public.43 In doing so, the Supreme Court has offered ample support for 
its stance against public interest standing. 
The Supreme Court’s refusal to permit public interest standing in the 
federal court system is founded on several principles,44 the foremost of which is 
standing’s essential role in ensuring the separation of powers.45 Indeed, the 
Court has opined that standing follows naturally from the Constitution and our 
“common understanding of what activities are appropriate to legislatures, to 
executives, and to courts.”46 To that end, the Court rejects standing in cases 
                                                                                                                       
 40 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2662 (“We have repeatedly held that . . . a ‘generalized 
grievance,’ no matter how sincere, is insufficient to confer standing.”); Lance v. Coffman, 
549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007) (per curiam) (“Our refusal to serve as a forum for generalized 
grievances has a lengthy pedigree.”); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74 (opining that standing will 
not be conferred upon an individual “claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest 
in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly 
and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large”); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 
754 (1984) (ruling that attempt to require government to act in accordance with the law, 
without injury, is insufficient to confer standing); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 
488 (1923) (stating that standing will not be conferred where plaintiff suffers “in some 
indefinite way in common with people generally”). 
 41 See, e.g., Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65 (1986). 
 42 Id. at 71 (holding that a plaintiff lacked standing to defend constitutionality of statute 
because he lacked a personal injury in fact); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the 
War, 418 U.S. 208, 209, 217 (1974) (holding that plaintiffs, in an action to prevent members 
of Congress from serving in the military reserves, lacked standing because they presented 
only an “injury in the abstract”). 
 43 See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing where action 
alleged government aid to religion in violation of the Establishment Clause because they 
failed to identify any injury separate from that to the public at large). 
 44 The principles of federal standing explored here are not, by any means, exhaustive; 
rather, they are the principles best translated to state courts and most relevant to the 
subsequent discussion of public interest standing in state courts. See infra Part V.B. 
 45 The Supreme Court is unmistakably clear in announcing the importance of separation 
of powers in decisions on the nature and scope of the standing doctrine. See Hollingsworth, 
133 S. Ct. at 2659 (“[Standing] is an essential limit on our power: It ensures that we act as 
judges, and do not engage in policymaking properly left to elected representatives.”); Raines 
v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997) (reinforcing that standing doctrine represents an 
“overriding and time-honored concern about keeping the Judiciary’s power within its proper 
constitutional sphere”); Allen, 468 U.S. at 752 (“[T]he law of Art. III standing is built on a 
single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.”). 
 46 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992).  
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involving only generalized injuries because the judiciary is not to be used “as a 
forum in which to air . . . generalized grievances about the conduct of 
government.”47 Rather, the proper route to redress generalized grievances is 
through the political process.48 Standing, therefore, “serves to prevent the 
judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches,” 
leading to the Court’s conclusion that public interest standing has no place in 
federal courts.49  
Next, standing is intended to ensure that federal courts settle only those 
disputes that are truly adversarial in nature. The Supreme Court strictly adheres 
to this principle, which is reflected in the Court’s refusal to issue advisory 
opinions.50 In turn, the general disdain for advisory opinions can find its roots in 
the historical role of the judiciary−to resolve actual, concrete disputes.51  
Finally, disallowing public interest standing serves the very practical 
function of promoting judicial efficiency. Beyond the heavy caseload facing 
most courts,52 the standing doctrine creates uniform requirements for all 
litigants in a vast federal court system.53 One can imagine the chaos that would 
result if every federal court were permitted to create its own standing doctrine; 
already exhaustive jurisdictional battles would multiply as would-be plaintiffs 
lined up to sue in those courts allowing public interest standing.54 With these 
considerations in mind, the Supreme Court has rejected an expanded view of 
                                                                                                                       
 47 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 174 (1974) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 
U.S. 83, 106 (1968)). 
 48 Id. at 179; see Eric J. Segall, Standing Between the Court and the Commentators: A 
Necessity Rationale for Public Actions, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 351, 357 (1993) (“Because the 
judicial branch is less accountable to the people than are the Congress and the President, it 
should avoid making pronouncements of public policy unless personal rights are at stake.”). 
 49 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013). 
 50 U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 446 (1993) 
(“[A] federal court [lacks] the power to render advisory opinions.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Flast, 392 U.S. at 96 (explaining that federal courts have firmly established as a 
prevailing pillar of justiciability the rule against advisory opinions). But see Siegel, supra 
note 8, at 117–19 (noting the advent in recent times of declaratory judgment actions and the 
inherent conflict with the Court’s negative view of advisory opinions). 
 51 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (explaining that the purpose of standing is 
“to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which 
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult . . . questions”). This is further 
related to the rule that federal courts “will not entertain friendly suits or those which are 
feigned or collusive in nature.” Flast, 392 U.S. at 100 (citations omitted). 
 52 See generally Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2014, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/caseload-statistics-
2014.aspx (last visited Apr. 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/DM94-4T34. 
 53 Beyond the Supreme Court, the federal court system encompasses ninety-four 
judicial districts and thirteen courts of appeals. Courts of Appeals, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/CourtofAppeals.asp
x (last visited Apr. 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/7DTD-SDUK. As such, there is 
much to be gained from—if not an absolute necessity for—a uniform standing doctrine at 
the federal level.  
 54 See infra Appendix, Table I.  
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standing, even in cases (such as Hollingsworth) where state courts have initially 
applied a broad view of standing.55  
III. STANDING IN STATE COURTS: THE LACK OF THE CASE-OR-
CONTROVERSY REQUIREMENT AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORTING 
AN EXPANDED VIEW OF STANDING  
Despite the widespread concern expressed by the Supreme Court about the 
perils of public interest standing, the doctrine is pervasive in state court 
systems.56 Those state courts permitting public interest standing focus not only 
on the inapplicability of the United States Constitution, but also on numerous 
other differences between the federal and state court systems.57 Collectively, 
these differences are offered to justify deviation from the federal framework of 
standing by allowing several alternative forms of standing.58 However, 
irrespective of these differences and the numerous forms of alternative standing 
in state courts, public interest standing stands alone in offering no relation to an 
injury-in-fact. 
State courts almost uniformly begin any standing analysis by highlighting 
the inapplicability of the case-or-controversy requirement outside federal 
courts.59 This is simply one of a plethora of major differences scholars highlight 
between state and federal court systems,60 and many of these differences have 
been used as support for public interest standing. The most common is political 
accountability, as most state judges are elected rather than appointed.61 
Additionally, state constitutions are considerably more malleable than the 
Federal Constitution, suggesting that state law is (and should be) more fluid 
                                                                                                                       
 55 Similar concerns have been addressed by several states whose courts have rejected 
public interest standing. See infra Appendix, Table 1. 
 56 See infra Appendix, Table 1. 
 57 See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the 
Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1844, 1886–91 (2001). 
 58 These alternative forms of standing include statutory standing, representational 
standing, taxpayer standing, and, of course, public interest standing. See infra note 134. 
 59 This holds true regardless of the state’s position on public interest standing. Where 
courts find in favor of public interest standing, they emphasize the lack of the case-or-
controversy as making public interest standing permissible. See, e.g., State ex rel. Cittadine 
v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 790 N.E.2d 978, 979 (Ind. 2003) (“Unlike the language of Article 
III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, the Indiana Constitution contains no ‘case or 
controversy’ requirement.”). Similarly, even where courts reject the notion of public interest 
standing, they often do so by explicitly choosing to extend and apply the case-or-controversy 
requirement despite being under no obligation to do so. See Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air 
Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444–45 (Tex. 1993). 
 60 See Jeffrey S. Sutton, What Does—and Does Not—Ail State Constitutional Law, 59 
U. KAN. L. REV. 687, 688 (2011). 
 61 Nearly 90% of state court judges hold their position as the result of some form of 
election. Dale Carpenter, Four Arguments Against a Marriage Amendment that Even an 
Opponent of Gay Marriage Should Accept, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 71, 76 (2004). 
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than federal law.62 The collective force of these considerations has led to the 
conclusion that many of the concerns attached to public interest standing in 
federal courts are absent in state courts.63 
A. Constitutional Differences and the Absence of the Case-or- 
Controversy Requirement 
Nearly every state court begins an analysis of standing with a variation of 
the following statement: “Unlike the federal system, the judicial power of the 
state . . . is not constitutionally restricted by the language of Article III of the 
United States Constitution requiring ‘cases’ and ‘controversies,’ since no 
similar requirement exists in the [state’s] Constitution.”64 This is an 
unquestionable tenet of state law, and one firmly supported by the Supreme 
Court of the United States.65 Many state courts view the absence of this 
requirement as liberation from the constraints of traditional standing.66 And, 
charged with “jurisdiction over a single state, not the entire nation,”67 state 
courts often decide to fill the gap left by the absence of Article III with public 
interest standing. 
Moreover, differences between the Federal Constitution and state 
constitutions do not end with the case-or-controversy requirement. State 
constitutions are notoriously long,68 and often resemble “super legislation” 
                                                                                                                       
 62 Sutton, supra note 60, at 690 (“[T]he majoritarian nature of the states’ amendment 
procedures invites rather than discourages alteration . . . .”). 
 63 See DiManno, supra note 21, at 658–59. 
 64 Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098, 1102 (Utah 2013) (granting public interest 
standing); see Armory Park Neighborhood Ass’n v. Episcopal Cmty. Servs. in Ariz., 712 
P.2d 914, 919 (Ariz. 1985) (“[T]he question of standing in Arizona is not a constitutional 
mandate since we have no counterpart to the ‘case or controversy’ requirement of the federal 
constitution.”). 
 65 ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“We have recognized often that 
the constraints of Article III do no apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts are 
not bound by the limitations of a case or controversy or other federal rules of 
justiciability . . . .”). 
 66 See, e.g., Fernandez v. Takata Seat Belts, Inc., 108 P.3d 917, 919 (Ariz. 2005) (en 
banc) (“[W]hen addressing questions of standing we are confronted only with questions of 
prudential or judicial restraint.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 67 Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences into Account: Toward 
a State-Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1629, 1632 
(2010). 
 68 By one count, state constitutions are, on average, almost four times longer than the 
Federal Constitution. Albert L. Sturm, The Development of American State Constitutions, 12 
PUBLIUS 57, 74 & n.57 (1982). As an extreme example, the Alabama Constitution is nearly 
350,000 words long; in contrast, the Federal Constitution contains only 4,543 words. H. 
Bailey Thomson, Constitutional Reform in Alabama: A Long Time in Coming, in 1 STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 113, 114 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. 
Williams eds., 2006). 
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rather than “sacred texts.”69 State constitutions’ length often results from the 
enumeration of positive rights, and courts interpret these rights as an invitation 
to engage broader substantive areas.70 State courts have accepted this invitation 
and, in the case of public interest standing, use it to forego the injury-in-fact 
requirement.71 
B. Accountability: The Difference Between an Appointed and an Elected 
Judiciary 
Another oft-cited difference between the federal and state court systems is 
that all federal judges are appointed, whereas in most states judges are elected.72 
Therefore, proponents of public interest standing argue that state judges should 
(or must) play a more active role in government.73 State judges are “experts in 
the law and politics of their state,”74 and therefore are more likely to respond to 
local issues.75 Judicial elections encourage judges to take a more active role in 
shaping the law, particularly because the threat of removal from office is 
omnipresent for judges who fail to satisfy the desires of their constituents.76 
An elected judiciary also benefits from its democratic legitimacy. Judicial 
elections provide “plenary” authority to state courts,77 whereas federal courts 
aside from the Supreme Court of the United States only possess jurisdiction as 
authorized by Congress.78 As such, an elected judiciary allows the people to 
respond to judicial decisions the electorate disfavors79 and establishes 
accountability amongst elected judges that may not apply to life-term judges.80 
                                                                                                                       
 69 Devins, supra note 67, at 1642 (quoting Lawrence Friedman, State Constitutions in 
Historical Perspective, 496 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 33, 35 (1988)). 
 70 See Hershkoff, supra note 57, at 1889–90 (“[B]ecause state constitutions often 
include positive rights and regulatory norms, their texts explicitly engage state courts in 
substantive areas that have historically been outside the Article III domain.”); see also 
DiManno, supra note 21, at 661 (stating that positive rights in state constitutions “encourage 
and often depend upon judicial involvement for their interpretation and enforcement”). 
 71 See, e.g., Grant Cnty. Fire Prot. Dist. No. 5 v. City of Moses Lake, 83 P.3d 419, 424 
(Wash. 2004) (explaining that Washington grants standing in cases without an injury-in-fact 
where the “controversy is of substantial public importance”). 
 72 See Sutton, supra note 60, at 700–02 (exploring judicial elections in various states). 
 73 See DiManno, supra note 21, at 660–61. 
 74 Devins, supra note 67, at 1632. 
 75 See generally Hershkoff, supra note 57. 
 76 See Devins, supra note 67, at 1659–60. 
 77 Hershkoff, supra note 57, at 1888. 
 78 “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and 
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 1.  
 79 See John Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals, 
and Case Selection: An Empirical Study, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 465, 488 (1999). 
 80 This represents one side of an ongoing debate, as “[t]he choice between appointment 
and election is often presented as a choice between judicial independence and judicial 
accountability . . . .” Michael DeBow et al., The Case for Partisan Judicial Elections, 33 U. 
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Against the backdrop of re-election, the logical incentive for state court judges 
is to retain their position and advance their preferred legal policy.81 The plenary 
authority of state courts thus encourages a more activist role in shaping public 
policy.82 This view of the judiciary’s role in individual state courts is readily 
compatible with public interest standing, as it provides judges more freedom to 
influence public policy than the more restrictive injury-in-fact view of standing. 
C. Malleability of State Law 
Finally, the fluidity of state constitutions implies that state standing doctrine 
need not be as rigid or formalistic as its federal counterpart. The evolution of 
state constitutions stands in stark contrast to the Federal Constitution: only one 
of the original thirteen states (Massachusetts) maintains its original constitution; 
over thirty states have adopted multiple constitutions;83 and states have 
amended their constitutions thousands of times.84 In light of the expansive 
nature of state constitutions,85 the judiciary must take on a more active role.86 
Thus, state judiciaries can use public interest standing as a vehicle to fulfill the 
role of interpreter of vast state constitutions.  
                                                                                                                       
TOL. L. REV. 393, 396 (2002). The federal system has clearly answered this question in favor 
of judicial independence, deeming it desirable that judges be independent “in the sense that 
they will apply the law fairly and without favoritism” while still being accountable “in the 
sense that they do not exercise their power arbitrarily, or in ways that undermine the judicial 
and political systems they have sworn to uphold.” Id. While states are decidedly mixed in 
their use of judicial elections, these elections create their own host of problems that may or 
may not justify their use. See David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. 
L. REV. 265, 317–24 (2008) (examining the costs judicial elections exact on democracy). 
 81 See Pozen, supra note 80, at 318 (observing that the “basic premise” of objection to 
judicial elections is that they “inject populist incentives into the branch of government that is 
meant to be most immune from them” because “elected judges will have to become more 
careful not to offend majority sentiment if they want to keep their jobs”); see also Devins, 
supra note 67, at 1659. 
 82 See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, The State and Federal Courts in Governance: Vive La 
Différence!, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1273, 1286 (2005). 
 83 See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING 
TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 237, 248–
49 tbl.1 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995). 
 84 See G. Alan Tarr, Introduction to STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY, supra note 68, at 1, 2. Alabama warrants another mention, as it has amended its 
constitution 740 times. Id.  
 85 See infra Part III.A. 
 86 See Hans A. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 248 
(1972) (noting the wide range and variety of non-traditional disputes settled by state courts 
using alternative forms of standing). 
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IV. THE MANY FACES OF PUBLIC INTEREST STANDING: CRITIQUING THE 
UNDERLYING PREMISES APPLIED BY STATE COURTS TO CONFER 
STANDING 
Although public interest standing can be examined as a singular doctrine, 
the concept is by no means uniform in its application in state courts.87 Public 
interest standing, by definition, cuts against the traditional construction of 
standing, and thus courts employ a variety of rationales to justify its 
application.88 Some state courts simply choose to confer standing to answer 
questions of great constitutional importance.89 More specifically, after 
examining standing doctrine in every state, common rationales for public 
interest standing begin to emerge: (1) the necessity of standing when individuals 
without an injury seek to force elected officials to uphold and fulfill their duties; 
(2) a trend to confer standing upon the “most appropriate” party to a dispute, 
even where that party may lack an individualized injury; and (3) the “nominal 
injury,” where courts stretch the meaning of the term injury to broaden the 
scope of standing. However, critical analysis reveals each rationale is 
insufficient to warrant a drastic broadening of traditional standing doctrine. 
A. Rejecting the Enforcement of Public Duties and Challenges of 
Constitutionality: Separation of Powers 
One of the common themes used by parties seeking public interest standing 
is the enforcement of a public duty.90 The core proposition is that every citizen 
suffers an injury when public officials fail to uphold the state constitution or fail 
to properly fulfill a public duty, and these failures allow any individual to have 
standing in court.91 On its face, this consideration may seem to actually align 
with concerns of separation of powers. By allowing standing in actions to 
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the judiciary serves as a check on the 
other branches of government.92 However, the delicate balance of a tripartite 
                                                                                                                       
 87 See infra Appendix, Table 1 for the rationales employed by each state that applies 
public interest standing. 
 88 DiManno, supra note 21, at 664, 670. 
 89 See Jolley v. State Loan & Inv. Bd., 38 P.3d 1073, 1077–79 (Wyo. 2002). 
 90 See, e.g., Tax Equity Alliance for Mass. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 672 N.E.2d 504, 
508–09 (Mass. 1996); Daily Gazette Co., Inc. v. Comm. on Legal Ethics of the W. Va. State 
Bar, 326 S.E.2d 705, 707 n.2 (W. Va. 1984); see also infra Appendix, Table 1 for those 
states using the enforcement of public duties as a basis for public interest standing. 
 91 Wells v. Purcell, 592 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Ark. 1979) (“[W]hen . . . the proceedings are 
for the enforcement of a duty affecting not a private right, but a public one, common to the 
whole community, it is not necessary that the relator should have a special interest in the 
matter . . . .”). 
 92 See Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. 
REV. 1265, 1296 (1961) (Standing “might be conceived in terms of demands for 
enforcement (1) of norms generally accepted as appropriate for the proper day-to-day 
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system of government results from each branch adhering to its proper role; 
allowing the judiciary to intentionally and unilaterally expand its role on its own 
could easily upset the balance. 
There is an inherent danger in allowing the judiciary to create jurisdiction 
for itself as a way to check the other branches of government. When used to 
enforce a public duty, public interest standing functions as a mechanism to hold 
elected officials accountable to the people.93 Such a function is redundant and 
unnecessary for one obvious reason: elected officials are accountable to citizens 
at the polls. Thus, for a general grievance harming all of the public, the public 
itself should be charged with holding officials accountable.94 All state officials 
take an oath to uphold their state’s constitution, and if citizens believe these 
officials fail in their duties, the next election provides an appropriate and 
adequate forum to voice their complaints.  
Additionally, the malleability of state law actually runs counter to public 
interest standing in this area, because it allows voters to have a greater impact 
upon the functionality of the government.95 The ease with which state 
constitutions can be amended provides citizens a clear avenue to make changes 
that public interest standing would instead leave to the judiciary. This preferable 
route of action was illustrated in Indiana in 2003, where an individual lacking 
any injury-in-fact sued to require the Indiana Department of Transportation to 
enforce a particular statute against railroads in the state.96 Although the 
Supreme Court of Indiana reaffirmed the vitality of public interest standing and 
found the plaintiff to have standing to sue, the case itself was moot; the 
challenged statute had already been amended to ameliorate the problem.97 
Even though the general application of this rationale is lacking, Ohio offers 
an example where it could be appropriate to confer public interest standing.98 In 
                                                                                                                       
conduct of government, or (2) of norms basic to the political and social process and to the 
citizen’s participation in it . . . .”). 
 93 See, e.g., Save the Plastic Bag Coal. v. City of Manhattan Beach, 254 P.3d 1005, 
1011 (Cal. 2011) (“[W]here the question is one of public right and the object of the 
mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the [petitioner] need not show that 
he has any legal or special interest in the result, since it is sufficient that he is interested as a 
citizen in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 94 See Julie R. O’Sullivan, Book Note, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 380, 382–83 (1985) 
(reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
(1982)) (observing that our society has a “commitment to democratic or electorally 
accountable decisionmaking,” primarily because “[i]nterpretivists and noninterpretivists take 
as axiomatic the political principle that governmental policymaking . . . ought to be subject 
to control by persons accountable to the electorate” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 95 See supra Part III.C. 
 96 State ex rel. Cittadine v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 790 N.E.2d 978, 978 (Ind. 2003). 
 97 Id. at 979. Unsurprisingly, the Indiana Supreme Court took the case “to acknowledge 
the availability of the public standing doctrine in Indiana courts” and spent almost the entire 
opinion discussing public interest standing before denying mandamus on grounds of 
mootness. Id. at 979, 985. 
 98 State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999). 
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State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, the Supreme Court of 
Ohio granted public interest standing in a mandamus action challenging the 
constitutionality of a legislative enactment amending rules related to torts and 
other civil actions.99 The court thus found standing to enforce the performance 
of a public duty and went on to find the legislative enactment 
unconstitutional.100 By doing so, the court presented perhaps the most 
appropriate use of public interest standing. 
Sheward differs drastically from most instances of public interest standing 
in that the Supreme Court of Ohio granted standing to preserve the notion of 
separation of powers rather than encroach upon it. The court began its standing 
analysis with an invocation of separation of powers,101 and found that the 
legislature had attempted to usurp the power of the judiciary.102 Hence, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio conferred public interest standing to protect, rather than 
expand, its own authority.103 Rather than violating separation of powers, 
Sheward can be viewed as actually supporting it.104  
Nevertheless, Sheward does not answer the question of whether there were 
preferable alternatives to attack the legislature’s action. As in Cittadine v. 
Indiana Department of Transportation, the enactment may have been amended 
or precluded by the people; in a more traditional approach, the people could 
elect a different majority in the legislature to overturn the enactment. Even more 
likely, many parties could have suffered an injury-in-fact as a result of the 
enactment in Sheward, and thus the case may have come before the court 
without the use of public interest standing at all. In fact, the Supreme Court of 
Ohio opened itself up to the potential for broader litigation through its decision 
in Sheward, as it is recently rejected a case where plaintiffs requested an 
expanded view of public interest standing using Sheward as the primary 
basis.105 The solution, of course, would be to reject public interest standing on 
                                                                                                                       
 99 Id. at 1084–85. 
 100 Id. at 1084, 1102. 
 101 Id. at 1081 (“These concerns become more acute where there may be an intrusion 
into areas committed to another and coequal branch of government.”). 
 102 Id. at 1084 (“The people of this state have delegated their judicial power to the 
courts, and have expressly prohibited the General Assembly from exercising it.”); see OHIO 
CONST. art. II, § 32, art. IV, § 1. 
103Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1085, 1104 (“The principle of separation of powers is embedded 
in the constitutional framework of our state government. The Ohio Constitution applies the 
principle in defining the nature and scope of powers designated to the three branches of 
government. . . . Thus, [t]he legislative branch has no right to limit the inherent powers of 
the judicial branch of government.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 104 See DiManno, supra note 21, at 669 (hypothesizing that “[t]he [Sheward] court may 
have acted more out of a fear of losing its power than out of a desire to vindicate the public 
interest”). 
 105 See ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 13 N.E.3d 1101, 1105–06 (Ohio 2014) 
(affirming dismissal of a challenge to legislation because plaintiffs lacked “a rare and 
extraordinary public issue” and limiting Sheward to original actions in mandamus and/or 
prohibition). Despite fervent requests to overrule Sheward as well, the Ohio Supreme Court 
instead chose to confirm—albeit in dicta—Sheward’s application to a certain “type of rare 
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the basis of enforcing a public duty altogether and to allow the political process 
to run its course. 
B. Rejecting the “Most Appropriate” Litigant: The Fallacy of Conferring 
Standing Because a Party Brought an Action Without It  
Perhaps the most prevalent rationale behind public interest standing is the 
idea that standing should be conferred upon the “most appropriate” party for 
issues of public significance.106 This form of public interest standing often 
occurs in the context of challenges to the constitutionality of legislative or 
executive action.107 Functionally, this means standing should be conferred if the 
party seeking standing—but lacking any actual harm—is at least as well-
positioned as any other potential plaintiff.108 The most common scenario, as 
described by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, is one where government 
activity would be unchallenged in the courts unless standing was conferred.109  
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania later emphasized the importance of 
judicial review as a basis for conferring public interest standing: 
The ultimate basis for granting standing to taxpayers must be sought outside 
the normal language of the courts. Taxpayers’ litigation seems designed to 
enable a large body of the citizenry to challenge governmental action which 
would otherwise go unchallenged in the courts because of the standing 
requirement. . . . Such litigation allows the courts, within the framework of 
traditional notions of “standing,” to add to the controls over public officials 
inherent in the elective process the judicial scrutiny of the statutory and 
constitutional validity of their acts.110 
This strong desire for judicial review often prevails even though another 
party may be better positioned to bring the suit, so long as the party is unlikely 
to do so.111 In particular, courts still rely on public interest standing if they 
                                                                                                                       
and extraordinary public-interest issue.” Id. at 1106. While the decision did reject the notion 
“that citizens should be able to challenge any alleged constitutional violations, regardless of 
rarity or magnitude,” it still gives courts the ability to expand their own jurisdiction by 
deciding what qualifies as sufficiently “rare and extraordinary.” Id. at 1105. 
 106 See infra Appendix, Table 1. 
 107 See, e.g., Baxley v. State, 958 P.2d 422, 429 (Alaska 1998) (conferring public 
interest standing to challenge constitutionality of legislative enactment). 
 108 See Trustees for Alaska v. State, 736 P.2d 324, 329 (Alaska 1987) (noting one 
criterion of public interest standing is that there cannot be another plaintiff “more directly 
affected by the challenged conduct in question who has or is likely to bring suit”). 
 109 See In re Biester, 409 A.2d 848, 852 (Pa. 1979). 
 110 Sprague v. Casey, 550 A.2d 184, 187 (Pa. 1988) (quoting In re Biester, 409 A.2d at 
848, 851 n.5). Although this quote was originally offered in support of taxpayer standing, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has come to use it to support its version of public interest 
standing. See id. 
 111 See Trustees for Alaska, 736 P.2d at 330. 
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believe the best-positioned parties are unlikely to bring suit because they 
actually benefit from the governmental action.112 
This rationale seems to beg the questions, “If not us, who? If not now, 
when?” Essentially, courts grant standing on the grounds that if standing is not 
conferred to the current plaintiff, no other plaintiff will come forward. The 
underlying logic is inherently flawed for two reasons. First, it assumes that the 
action in question must be challenged. Second, the party bringing the action is 
granted standing precisely because it initially brought the action without 
standing. Both arguments are dubious at best. 
The first step state courts use to avoid traditional limits on standing for the 
“most appropriate litigant” is to start with the assumption that the 
constitutionality of the action in question must be subject to judicial review. In 
these cases, the common refrain uttered by state courts is that government 
action “would otherwise go unchallenged.”113 Courts following this line of 
thinking unsurprisingly confer standing regardless of actual injury as a premise 
for applying judicial review to action taken by the other branches of 
government.114 Thus, this rationale completely glosses over the heart of the 
concept of standing—whether an issue is justiciable and whether the judiciary is 
the proper forum for it to be decided—by automatically assuming that all 
government action should be subject to judicial review. 
If all government action is subject to judicial review—as this line of 
reasoning invariably assumes—then state courts must confer standing in order 
to apply judicial review. This is a classic example of “shifting the goalposts”; 
having decided that the judiciary should rule on the merits, the court quickly 
passes by considerations of any actual injury to do so.115 Courts have essentially 
moved the starting point of standing analysis so far in favor of judicial review 
that the outcome (granting public interest standing) is inevitable. However, such 
a view expands the role of the judiciary beyond the normal bounds of separation 
of powers. The idea that all action by government officials is automatically 
subject to judicial review must be rejected on its face; similarly, the notion that 
all action should be reviewed must be rejected. 
All state officials take an oath to uphold their state constitution and are 
subject to electoral accountability at the hands of the voters.116 Therefore, it is 
not the judiciary’s place to assume all actions taken by government officials 
                                                                                                                       
 112 See, e.g., Sprague, 550 A.2d at 187 (conferring public interest standing where “the 
issue was likely to escape judicial review when those directly and immediately affected by 
the complained of conduct were beneficially affected as opposed to adversely affected”).  
 113 In re Biester, 409 A.2d at 851 n.5 (citation omitted). 
 114 For example, courts often take this approach when applying public interest standing 
for the enforcement of a public duty. See supra Part IV.A. 
 115 See Randy E. Barnett, The Presumption of Liberty and the Public Interest: Medical 
Marijuana and Fundamental Rights, 22 WASH. U. J.L. &. POL’Y 29, 43 (2006) (“In the end, 
the Court gets to decide how it wants to rule and then it can rule that way by how it chooses 
to [approach] the question.”).  
 116 See supra Part IV.A. 
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must receive a judge’s stamp of approval to achieve legitimacy. State courts 
should continue to view standing as a threshold matter that must be decided 
before reaching the merits of the case, rather than creating a blanket rule that all 
government action is subject to judicial review so long as one person decides to 
challenge it in court. 
The second step courts employ to confer standing using the “most 
appropriate litigant” theory requires even more creativity. In these situations, 
the party bringing the action is (functionally) granted standing precisely because 
it initially brought suit without standing. In very simple terms, the potential 
plaintiff requests standing only because it lacks standing, and the court grants 
standing only because the potential plaintiff lacks it.117 This is a circular and 
illogical argument that ignores the functional role of standing—as well as every 
concept encompassed in justiciability—as a threshold issue that must be 
satisfied before the actual merits of the case can be adjudicated.118 
Standing properly informs potential plaintiffs of the type of action they can 
or cannot bring.119 By applying the “most appropriate litigant” theory, courts 
reward those individuals who choose to ignore the doctrine of standing at the 
expense of those who adhere to it. For example, imagine a government action 
leaving a significant number of citizens (assume 100) unhappy. Furthermore, 
assume each discontented citizen approaches his or her attorney and expresses a 
desire to bring suit in state court to challenge the complained-of action. If none 
of these citizens have an actual injury, the common (and correct) answer given 
by attorneys will be that they cannot sue because of a lack of standing. In this 
scenario, the doctrine of standing will have fulfilled its role and prevented 100 
lawsuits from being filed where no actual injury occurred.  
However, imagine that a single attorney decides to recommend filing the 
lawsuit despite acknowledging the lack of standing. Surely, this attorney and 
plaintiff should not have their intentional disregard for the law rewarded by a 
court conferring standing. Surely, the fact that this one person chose to bring 
suit in the face of notions of justiciability should not be considered the “most 
appropriate litigant” only because he or she chose to ignore a basic tenet of the 
law. Yet, this is one of the driving rationales applied by courts in fashioning 
public interest standing. Combined, these two issues imply an expanded role for 
the judiciary and the potential for frivolous lawsuits by plaintiffs’ attorneys who 
reap the benefit of every extension of the standing doctrine. Such an outcome is 
undesirable and should be rejected by state courts. 
                                                                                                                       
 117 See Siegel, supra note 8, at 117–19. 
 118 Contra Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—
and Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 639 (2006) (“[I]t is now 
commonplace that decisions about justiciability are often a form of decisions on the 
merits[,]” and in particular, “[t]he penetration of merits judgments into justiciability 
determinations prominently occurs in standing analysis.”). 
 119 For example, in the federal system’s more clearly-established standing doctrine, 
plaintiffs know they must be able to satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement. See supra 
Part II. 
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C. Rejecting the Nominal Injury: Manufacturing Standing Where None 
Exists 
Perhaps the most questionable of all bases for public interest standing is the 
nominal injury, where state courts confer standing upon litigants with only a 
minor (nominal) injury-in-fact so long as it is coupled with an issue of great 
public importance.120 In application, only a “slight private interest, added to and 
harmonizing with the public interest,” is sufficient to confer standing.121 
Generally, state courts applying this rationale acknowledge that “the law of 
standing . . . is construed liberally” before using the public interest to transform 
a nominal or slight injury into an injury-in-fact.122 While state courts may grant 
public interest standing to offer redress for these nominal injuries, the actual 
impact is to allow “public importance” to create injuries where none exist. 
Traditionally, standing is satisfied by the existence of a direct injury.123 To 
require (or allow) courts to undertake a threshold analysis of the severity of an 
injury as a determinative factor for standing undermines the entire premise of 
standing. The law offers redress for injuries, so long as those injuries are 
capable of redress.124 As such, all cases must fall into one of two categories: (1) 
the plaintiff has suffered (or alleged) an actual injury-in-fact; or (2) the plaintiff 
has not suffered an actual injury-in-fact. While a person may undoubtedly suffer 
a “slight” injury, a slightly injured person is injured nonetheless.125 Clearly, 
then, there is no need to expand the standing doctrine to address a slight injury-
in-fact. 
In reality, state courts use the “nominal injury” as a creative mechanism to 
confer public interest standing on individuals who have suffered no cognizable 
harm. For example, in McConkey v. Van Hollen, the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin conferred standing upon an individual challenging the process used 
to adopt a constitutional amendment against gay marriage.126 The court felt 
that—at most—the plaintiff alleged an injury in common with all voters harmed 
                                                                                                                       
 120 See infra Appendix, Table 1. 
 121 N.J. State Chamber of Commerce v. N.J. Election Law Enforcement Comm’n, 411 
A.2d 168, 173 (N.J. 1980) (quoting Elizabeth Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Howell, 132 A.2d 
779, 786 (N.J. 1957)). 
 122 McConkey v. Van Hollen, 783 N.W.2d 855, 860 (Wis. 2010); see N.J. State 
Chamber of Commerce, 411 A.2d at 173. 
 123 The other requirements of standing must also be met, but as previously discussed, 
public interest standing is primarily intended to negate the injury-in-fact requirement. See 
supra Part II. Whether the injury is traceable to the conduct of the defendant or is capable of 
redress is a separate inquiry, and this Note assumes that the first requirement (injury-in-fact) 
is the only preclusion to standing.  
 124 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). 
 125 In Hawaii, for example, courts have granted standing for any manner of slight (but 
actual) injuries. See Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Transp., 167 P.3d 292, 314–15 (Haw. 2007). 
 126 McConkey, 783 N.W.2d at 858. 
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by an amendment improperly submitted to the people.127 Furthermore, the court 
found it “difficult to determine the precise nature of the injury” and was 
“troubled by the broad general voter standing” implicated by the case.128 Yet, 
despite these valid concerns, the court granted standing to adjudicate the 
claim.129 In doing so, the court functionally implied that although the plaintiff 
was not injured, there was ample support to find public interest standing. 
As if to illustrate the point, the court found support for its decision because 
it was “likely that if [plaintiff’s] claim were dismissed on standing grounds, 
another person who could more clearly demonstrate standing would bring an 
identical suit.”130 Further, the court believed another plaintiff—presumably one 
with an actual injury—would not improve the court’s understanding of the 
issues.131 The court actually went so far as to suggest that it was preferable to 
have a plaintiff without an injury.132 If taken to its logical conclusion, this 
would imply that the first person to file a lawsuit will have standing so long as 
the controversy is sufficiently (and subjectively) “important” and the litigant 
zealously argues its side. Any question of injury would be removed from the 
analysis altogether—an outcome the Supreme Court of Wisconsin would surely 
want to avoid and one that cannot be used to justify public interest standing. 
The nominal injury serves as a powerful representation of the entire concept 
of public interest standing. Essentially, each basis for public interest standing 
comes back to the same idea: the issue at hand is so important that the court 
should adjudicate it. Indeed, many courts dispose of any of these rationales and 
simply allow standing in matters of great public importance.133 Having 
addressed these rationales, finding them lacking, and discovering they simply 
constitute different shades of the same concept, state courts should take a new 
approach when addressing the issue of public interest standing.  
                                                                                                                       
 127 Id. at 860. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Ironically, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin neglected to actually identify the exact 
reasoning behind its decision to confer standing. Id. (“[W]hether as a matter of judicial 
policy, or because [plaintiff] has at least a trifling interest in his voting rights, we believe the 
unique circumstances of this case render the merits of [plaintiff]’s claim fit for 
adjudication.”). In other words, the court chose to hear the case because it was sufficiently 
important, irrespective of the existence or absence of standing. 
 130 Id. at 861.  
 131 Id.  
 132 The court gave five reasons in total supporting standing: (1) the plaintiff zealously 
argued his case; (2) if the plaintiff’s claim was dismissed, another person who could meet 
standing requirements would almost certainly bring the case; (3) an individual who suffered 
an injury-in-fact would not enhance the court’s understanding of the issue; (4) analyzing the 
nature of the injury might require premature interpretation of the substance of the 
amendment (thus suggesting the court actually preferred an uninjured plaintiff); and (5) the 
important question of constitutional law at issue needed answered. McConkey, 783 N.W.2d 
at 860–61. 
 133 See, e.g., Baird v. Charleston Cnty., 511 S.E.2d 69, 75 (S.C. 1999) (“[A] court may 
confer standing upon a party when an issue is of such public importance as to require its 
resolution for future guidance.”). 
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V. A LIMITED VIEW OF PUBLIC INTEREST STANDING AND THE 
IMPORTANCE OF AN ANSWER 
Public interest standing stands alone as the only time courts adjudicate 
matters lacking an injury-in-fact.134 State courts often point to the absence of 
                                                                                                                       
 134 Public interest standing, in addition to having numerous forms and rationales, is part 
of a subset of alternative standing doctrines utilized in state courts. These doctrines may be 
considered “alternative” because they deviate from the traditional (i.e., federal) form of 
standing in some way, shape, or form. See generally Nathaniel B. Edmonds, Comment, 
Associational Standing for Organizations with Internal Conflicts of Interest, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 351 (2002) (examining associational standing); Radha A. Pathak, Statutory Standing 
and the Tyranny of Labels, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 89 (2009) (examining statutory standing); 
Joshua G. Urquhart, Disfavored Constitution, Passive Virtues? Linking State Constitutional 
Fiscal Limitations and Permissive Taxpayer Standing Doctrines, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1263 
(2012) (examining taxpayer standing).  
  Taxpayer standing is conferred upon an individual seeking to ensure (or force) the 
government to use his or her tax dollars in an appropriate manner. See Urquhart, supra, at 
1272–77 (explaining the concept of taxpayer standing in federal and state courts). It 
generally requires a taxpayer to have paid taxes into a specific fund, at which point they 
have standing to sue with regards to the government’s use of the moneys in that fund. See id. 
Taxpayer standing exists in some form in nearly every state. Id. at 1276. 
  Associational standing allows organizations to litigate claims on behalf of their 
members. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). 
Associational standing (also referred to as “representational standing”) exists in both federal 
and state court systems. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. 
Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 557 (1996); Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 148, 
AFL-CIO v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 828 N.E.2d 1104, 1112–13 (Ill. 2005) (applying the 
doctrine of associational standing); see also Edmonds, supra, at 357–58; Myriam E. Gilles, 
Representational Standing: U.S. ex rel. Stevens and the Future of Public Law Litigation, 89 
CALIF. L. REV. 315, 337–38 (2001); Tacy F. Flint, Comment, A New Brand of 
Representational Standing, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1037 (2003); Kelsey McCowan 
Heilman, Comment, The Rights of Others: Protection and Advocacy Organizations’ 
Associational Standing to Sue, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 237, 251 (2008).  
  Additionally, statutory standing—which was one form of standing the petitioners in 
Hollingsworth v. Perry sought to use—can be a valid method of conferring standing without 
an injury so long as it is enacted by the legislature and the court system does not find it 
unconstitutional. See Pathak, supra, at 91. It represents a situation where the legislature has 
determined certain classes of persons must be allowed to seek redress in the court system. Id. 
While these doctrines are similar to public interest standing in their relaxation of federal 
standing requirements, even among these “alternative” doctrines, public interest standing 
stands alone because it is only effective in the complete absence of an injury-in-fact. 
  Despite often being grouped (or directly compared) to these alternative forms of 
standing, public interest standing is unique in three respects. First, public interest standing 
has no basis in, and cannot be traced to, a particularized injury-in-fact. See supra Part IV. 
Taxpayer standing involves the alleged misuse of tax dollars paid into a specific fund, and 
therefore includes a direct link between the injury (the misuse of tax dollars) and the party 
seeking standing (the party paid into that specific fund). See Urquhart, supra, at 1272. 
Similarly, when courts grant associational standing, the “representative” party has standing 
because the members of the association would have had standing based upon an injury-in-
fact. See Heilman, supra, at 251. Accordingly, public interest standing deviates from the 
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the case-or-controversy requirement as justification for an expanded view of 
standing.135 However, the absence of the requirement does not eliminate the 
sound reasoning behind it, nor should it encourage state courts to choose a 
drastically different path. Doing so ignores the basis of the case-or-controversy 
requirement and the numerous positive aspects it could bring to state courts.  
State courts should adopt, or at least move toward, a more restrictive 
doctrine of standing by applying the reasoning used by the federal court system. 
The first step is for state courts to properly lay out the limits to their doctrine of 
standing. The federal court system, with the case-or-controversy requirement, 
provides notice to litigants as to what it will and will not adjudicate, thus 
improving the probability that most cases will be addressed on their merits. 
Then, by eliminating or limiting public interest standing, state courts would also 
adhere to the political process and separation of powers, considerations that do 
not (and should not) disappear simply because the case-or-controversy 
requirement does not strictly apply. 
A. Muddied Waters: The Need for a Clear Position on Public Interest 
Standing 
First and foremost among the positive aspects of the federal doctrine of 
standing is, coincidentally, the existence of the doctrine itself. Standing, as a 
component of justiciability, is a threshold matter that courts must dispense with 
before turning to the merits of any particular case.136 Accordingly, it is in the 
                                                                                                                       
principal characteristic of taxpayer and associational standing because both taxpayer and 
associational standing have a connection to an injury-in-fact, however tenuous it may be. 
  Second, public interest standing functionally equates to the judiciary unilaterally 
expanding its own authority. This implies a violation of the concept of separation of powers, 
and thus makes public interest standing fundamentally different from statutory standing, 
where the legislature expanded the power of the judiciary. See, e.g., Cnty. of Cook ex rel. 
Rifkin v. Bear Stearns & Co., 831 N.E.2d 563, 565–66 (Ill. 2005). However, despite the 
attractiveness of statutory standing as more reflective of the political process, state courts 
have not always accepted a legislative grant of broader standing. See id. at 569–70 (finding a 
statute conferring standing upon a private party lacking an injury-in-fact unconstitutional 
because it usurped the state attorney’s constitutionally derived power). 
  Finally—and perhaps most telling of all—public interest standing is applied only 
when no other form of standing can be found. This suggests that even those courts that 
confer public interest standing find it to be the weakest grounds for standing. Thus, to apply 
public interest standing, courts must go completely beyond both an injury-in-fact and the 
entire political process. 
 135 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Transp., 167 P.3d 292, 312 (Haw. 2007). 
 136 However, as the Supreme Court recently noted, Article III requires that an “actual 
controversy” persist throughout all stages of litigation. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 
S. Ct. 721, 726 (2013). This means that, at least in federal court, parties must have both 
standing to bring an action and standing to appeal. Arizonans for Official English v. 
Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997). This was illustrated in Hollingsworth v. Perry, where the 
Supreme Court found that petitioners did not have standing to appeal, thus effectively 
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best interests of any court to establish clear standing doctrine so that potential 
plaintiffs will know whether they can bring a particular action. By doing so, 
state courts can ensure that precious judicial resources are spent adjudicating 
cases on the merits, rather than trying to decide whether the case should be 
heard at all. 
Nowhere is the problem of an unclear standing doctrine more evident than 
in the area of public interest standing.137 Because public interest standing is 
only applied when no actual injury is present, an ambiguous public interest 
standing doctrine provides little indication to potential litigants whether they 
will have standing. This makes it more likely that, at least until courts give a 
consistent answer to public interest standing, they will spend more time making 
decisions on whether to hear cases at all instead of adjudicating them on the 
merits.138 Colorado’s approach to public interest standing illustrates the 
problems with an ambiguous standing doctrine. 
Colorado appears to allow public interest standing, but two major cases, 
Nicholl v. E-470 Public Highway Authority139 and Barber v. Ritter,140 have 
created a confusing standard that blurs the line between traditional (injury-
based) standing, statutory standing, taxpayer standing, and public interest 
standing. In Nicholl, and again in Barber, the Supreme Court of Colorado 
seemed to fully embrace public interest standing.141 However, deeper analysis 
of the context of these decisions reveals that their holdings do little to answer 
the question of public interest standing. 
The lineage of Nicholl strongly supports the existence of public interest 
standing in Colorado. In 1955, the Supreme Court of Colorado conferred 
standing upon an individual who challenged the validity of an amendment to the 
city charter that would change the method of electing city councilmen.142 The 
court provided an eloquent explanation for its decision, one that looks very 
                                                                                                                       
rendering the District Court’s opinions as the final decision in the case. See 133 S. Ct. 2652, 
2668 (2013); see also Weiss, supra note 4. 
 137 See Hershkoff, supra note 57, at 1854–55 (noting that nearly every state confers 
some form of taxpayer standing). 
 138 For example, the most recent litigation involving public interest standing in Ohio 
lasted almost three years without a single brief or argument on the merits. See generally 
ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 13 N.E.3d 1101 (Ohio 2014); ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. 
JobsOhio, No. 11CVH0810807, 2011 WL 12565593 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 2, 2011) 
(original complaint filed Aug. 29, 2011). 
 139 Nicholl v. E-470 Public Highway Auth., 896 P.2d 859 (Colo. 1995) (en banc). 
 140 Barber v. Ritter, 196 P.3d 238 (Colo. 2008) (en banc). 
 141 In both cases, the Court made the following statement in conferring standing: 
“[E]ven where no direct economic harm is implicated, a citizen has standing to pursue his or 
her interest in ensuring that governmental units conform to the state constitution.” Barber, 
196 P.3d at 246; Nicholl, 896 P.2d at, 866 (citing Dodge v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 600 P.2d 
70, 71 (Colo. 1979) (en banc)). This statement, on its face, would appear to demonstrate the 
existence of public interest standing in the form of challenging the constitutionality of 
government acts. See supra Part IV.C.  
 142 Howard v. City of Boulder, 290 P.2d 237, 238 (Colo. 1955) (en banc). 
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familiar143 as a tenet of public interest standing.144 How, then, can such a clear 
and concise espousal of public interest standing, dating all the way back to 
1955, not provide a clear answer as to Colorado’s standing doctrine? 
The answer, or lack thereof, is derived from Colorado’s inconsistent 
framework of standing and its application in Barber and Nicholl. First, the 
actual framework of standing itself is confusing and inconsistent. The Supreme 
Court of Colorado generally employs a two-part test for standing: (1) the 
plaintiff must suffer “injury-in-fact,” and (2) the injury must be to a “legally 
protected interest as contemplated by statutory or constitutional provisions.”145 
Despite this standard, the Barber court simultaneously required an actual 
injury146 while also (contradictorily) repeating the language from Nicholl 
supporting public interest standing without an injury-in-fact.147 The best 
explanation for such inconsistency is that the Supreme Court of Colorado 
considers governmental violations of constitutional provisions as providing an 
injury-in-fact to all citizens of Colorado.148  
Regardless, application of this framework to Barber and Nicholl does 
nothing to clarify public interest standing. In both cases, the Supreme Court of 
Colorado concurrently referenced an actual injury (traditional standing), a 
challenge to the expenditure or transfer of public funds (taxpayer standing), and 
a challenge to the constitutionality of government action as conferred by the 
state’s constitution (statutory standing) before deciding to nominally grant 
public interest standing.149 With so many theories of standing floating around, 
courts and potential litigators are left unsure as to whether Colorado truly 
allows public interest standing.150 
                                                                                                                       
 143 See supra Part IV. 
 144 Howard, 290 P.2d at 238 (“The interest and concern of plaintiff as a taxpayer is not 
primarily confined to himself alone, but is of great public concern; particularly so when it is 
apparent that the municipality and its officers have avoided doing anything that would raise 
the question of the validity of their acts . . . . If a taxpayer and citizen of the community be 
denied the right to bring such an action . . . then wrong must go unchallenged, and the citizen 
and taxpayer reduced to mere spectator without redress. We can think of none who have a 
better right.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 145 Barber, 196 P.3d at 245 (quoting Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 570 P.2d 535, 539 (Colo. 
1977)). Naturally, the existence of an actual “injury-in-fact” would seem to eliminate the 
need for public interest standing. See infra Part IV. 
 146 Id. at 246 (explaining that an injury that is indirect or incidental will not convey 
standing). 
 147 Id. (“[E]ven where no direct economic harm is implicated, a citizen has standing to 
pursue his or her interest in ensuring that governmental units conform to the state 
constitution.”). 
 148 “[W]e have interpreted Wimberly to confer standing when a plaintiff argues that a 
governmental action that harms him is unconstitutional.” Id. at 246. (quoting Ainscough v. 
Owens, 90 P.3d 851, 856 (Colo. 2004) (emphasis added)). 
 149 See id. at 246–47; Nicholl v. E-470 Public Highway Auth., 896 P.2d 859, 865–66 
(Colo. 1995) (en banc). 
 150 As if to drive this point home, the concurring opinion in Barber questioned the 
approach of the majority in merging these vastly different concepts of standing, as well as 
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Reading through the decision in Barber, it is nearly impossible to decide 
which form of standing the Supreme Court used as a backdrop for its decision. 
Taxpayer standing? Statutory standing? A general “public importance” 
doctrine? Such questions are, at present time, without a definitive answer. 
Unsurprisingly, at least one division of the Colorado Court of Appeals, clearly 
perplexed by Barber, concluded that Colorado’s standing doctrine still requires 
some injury or “nexus” between the plaintiff and the alleged conduct.151  
The decision of the Colorado appellate court is likely to be a common 
outcome when state courts are unclear about the contours of standing. Without a 
clear indication of the limitations (or lack thereof) on public interest standing, 
various trial courts and appellate courts will attempt to follow the reasoning of 
the court of last resort with limited knowledge and insight, relying on 
assumptions regarding the highest court’s rationale. The ramifications of this 
outcome include the possibility of numerous inconsistent standards between 
courts in the same state,152 an influx of lawsuits with tenuous grounds for 
standing, and general confusion for potential plaintiffs and litigants everywhere. 
With the ultimate goal of the judiciary to adjudicate disputes on the merits, the 
Supreme Court of Colorado, along with other states in similar situations, should 
establish a clear framework answering the question of whether it will allow 
public interest standing without an injury.153 
The confusion of state courts’ use of the public interest doctrine stands in 
stark contrast to the federal court system’s jurisprudence on standing. While 
novel questions of standing still arise, the Supreme Court of the United States 
has maintained a consistent approach to public interest standing that can be seen 
                                                                                                                       
the long-term impact of such a framework and decision. See Barber, 196 P.3d at 254 (Eid, J., 
concurring). 
 151 Hotaling v. Hickenlooper, 275 P.3d 723, 726–27 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011) (reading 
Barber as applying taxpayer standing—and thus finding some form of actual injury—
because “based on the context of the [decision] and the holdings of the cases on which the 
court relied, [] the court did not intend to dispense with the requirement that there be some 
nexus” between the plaintiff and the challenged government action). The Hotaling court 
made this conclusion despite the Supreme Court of Colorado’s clear statement in Barber that 
“when a plaintiff-taxpayer alleges that a government action violates a specific constitutional 
provision . . . such an averment satisfies the two-step standing analysis.” Id. at 726 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 152 For example, Colorado has sixty-four county courts, twenty-two district courts, and 
several divisions within the Court of Appeals. See Colorado’s State Court System, COLO. 
JUD. BRANCH, http://www.courts.state.co.us/Courts/Index.cfm (last visited Apr. 13, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/V6JR-E8D3. Thus, there is a very real possibility that these 
various courts will interpret the Supreme Court of Colorado’s inconclusive standing doctrine 
in different ways, resulting in numerous standards of standing in the same state.  
 153 The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that the Supreme Court of Colorado made 
its decision in Barber based solely on taxpayer standing. Hotaling, 275 P.3d at 726. 
However, the language used by the Supreme Court of Colorado indicates that if it indeed 
intended to apply taxpayer standing, it stretched the concept so far as to make it analogous to 
public interest standing. See Barber, 196 P.3d at 246–47.  
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from its decisions and applied in future cases.154 Although this consists of a 
complete rejection of the concept of public interest standing, the importance of 
an answer to the question of public interest standing cannot be overstated. Too 
many states lack a coherent approach to public interest standing, and the first 
step these states should take is to define whether they allow public interest 
standing. 
B. Developing a Limited Model of Standing Grounded in Considerations 
of Separation of Powers and Judicial Efficiency 
Having established the absolute necessity for a coherent approach to public 
interest standing, state court systems should draw heavily from the federal 
system’s approach to standing in fashioning their own individual frameworks. 
Those states without clearly-defined public interest doctrine should reject it in 
favor of traditional notions of standing, while those allowing public interest 
standing should curb the extent to which it applies.  
The concept of federalism recognizes the differences between the federal 
government and state governments.155 Inherent in this concept is an emphasis 
on sovereignty; the idea that states (and their courts) should construct identities 
distinct from federal influence.156 However, this does not, and indeed should 
not, encourage state courts to apply different reasoning and rationale to the law 
simply because they are not bound by the Constitution or federal courts. Herein 
lies a key distinction, one often lost as state courts expand standing doctrine: the 
fact that the case-or-controversy requirement does not extend to state courts 
does not constitute an unimpeachable mandate to expand standing in whatever 
manner each state court sees fit. This is not to say that the case-or-controversy 
requirement should uniformly apply to state courts; rather, it is an 
acknowledgement of the strong history and policy considerations underlying 
federal standing requirements.157 The reasoning underlying standing in federal 
courts offers a sound framework that state courts should incorporate, as both 
court systems share many of the same concerns and play similar roles in 
tripartite systems of government. 
                                                                                                                       
 154 See supra Part II. 
 155 See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. 
L. REV. 4, 6 (2009) (“Federalism is a system that permits minorities to rule, and we are 
intimately familiar with its benefits: federalism promotes choice, competition, participation, 
experimentation, and the diffusion of power.”) 
 156 Id.  
 157 Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation 
of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 894 (1983) (“There is, I think, a functional 
relationship [between standing and separation of powers], which can best be described by 
saying that the law of standing roughly restricts courts to their traditional undemocratic role 
of protecting individuals and minorities against impositions of the majority, and excludes 
them from the even more undemocratic role of prescribing how the other two branches 
should function in order to serve the interest of the majority itself.”). 
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Two considerations underlying the federal standing doctrine are equally 
present in state courts, and should lead to a restriction of public interest 
standing. First, the concept of separation of powers and the proper role of the 
judiciary strongly support a more restrictive view of public interest standing. 
Second, the need for judicial efficiency and the current burden on the court 
system provide encouragement to state courts to limit or reject the application 
of public interest standing. Together, these considerations provide strong 
support for the limiting of public interest standing.  
Separation of powers is one of the founding principles of the United States 
collectively, as well as the states individually.158 The Supreme Court of the 
United States often references separation of powers as a primary reason for the 
existence of justiciability and for limiting standing doctrine.159 The concept 
should, and can, be similarly persuasive in state courts to reign in the broad 
application of public interest standing.160 Considering nearly every state draws 
heavily from federal law in its explanation and application of standing,161 this is 
a simple extension of one of the best-supported principles in federal law. 
                                                                                                                       
 158 See Jack M. Beermann, An Inductive Understanding of Separation of Powers, 63 
ADMIN. L. REV. 467, 472 (2011) (“The federal government and all state governments are 
structured around the principle of separation of powers.”). Unsurprisingly, the concept of 
separation of powers has been studied extensively at the federal level. See, e.g., Laura S. 
Fitzgerald, Cadenced Power: The Kinetic Constitution, 46 DUKE L.J. 679, 717–23 (1997); 
John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
1939, 1978–85 (2011). Although state courts rarely reference the concept when 
implementing public interest standing, considerations for separation of powers are 
nonetheless present in individual states as well. See, e.g., David A. Carrillo & Danny Y. 
Chou, California Constitutional Law: Separation of Powers, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 655, 665–81 
(2011); John V. Orth, “Forever Separate and Distinct”: Separation of Powers in North 
Carolina, 62 N.C. L. REV. 1, 3–10 (1983). 
 159 See supra Part II.B. 
 160 However, this is not to suggest that federal and state court systems are identical or 
should be treated as such. See Hershkoff, supra note 57, at 1884–86 (“[The federal 
government system] does not adequately describe the diverse, redundant, overlapping, and 
often semiprivate governance structures of the fifty states. States are not required to adopt 
separation of powers, nor as Judge Posner explained, are they required to ‘imitate the 
separation of powers prescribed for the federal government.’ At their foundings, the states 
devised their institutions of government differently, and like most state constitutional 
arrangements, these provisions have often undergone significant amendment over the years. 
Separation of powers is thus not a stable concept, even within a single state. The variety of 
local governance structures further complicates the picture: local governments are also not 
required to conform to federal-style separation of powers and, for the most part, do not. In 
addition, the institutions of state government do not have the same capacities or structures as 
do the branches they parallel in the federal government. Although separation of powers 
shows marked variation in the fifty states, one can draw general distinctions between the 
state systems and the federal system that implicate justiciability and challenge many of the 
assumptions underlying federal doctrine as applied to state courts.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 161 Even those states that explicitly allow public interest standing regularly apply the 
“traditional” view of standing in cases, relying on public interest standing only when there is 
no injury. See, e.g., State ex rel. Cittadine v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 790 N.E.2d 978, 979 
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Public interest standing endangers the purpose of separation of powers 
because it essentially allows the judiciary to expand its own jurisdiction, and 
therefore its own power. In these circumstances, differences between state and 
federal governments162 actually seem to support a stricter application of the 
standing doctrine. Particularly, judicial elections—and the implications of an 
elected judiciary—necessitate a limitation of public interest standing.163 Of 
particular concern is the likelihood that majority opinion, private interests, or 
both will inappropriately influence judges.164 When judges must stand election, 
they are likely to cater to their own interests, and a primary interest is 
reelection.165 Thus, given the opportunity to weigh in on matters normally 
beyond the scope of the judiciary, judges have enormous incentive to do so by 
conferring public interest standing in cases that would be politically beneficial 
for reelection.166  
These concerns flow directly into issues of judicial activism and judicial 
efficiency. If public interest standing, in its purest form, boils down to courts 
conferring standing because the case at hand is sufficiently “important,” the 
standard for standing will vary from judge to judge, court to court, and issue to 
issue. Simply put, where do we (or courts) draw the line between a case that is 
publicly “important” and one that is not? And won’t courts necessarily have to 
redraw that line time and again, depending on what issues are currently 
“important” to the public? It is hard to imagine a more subjective scenario 
arising from a concept originally meant to be limited to objective injuries-in-
fact.167 
                                                                                                                       
(Ind. 2003) (beginning an analysis of standing with traditional, injury-based standing before 
turning to public interest standing); State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 
715 N.E.2d 1062, 1081 (Ohio 1999) (same). 
 162 See supra Part III. 
 163 The malleability of state law also supports a rejection of public interest standing. It is 
much easier for the people to effectuate changes in state law than federal law through 
amendments to state constitutions. See supra Part III.C. Thus, there is a lesser need for the 
judiciary to take matters into its own hands to correct problems of state law when no injury 
has occurred because the people themselves—who, collectively, are theoretically those 
harmed in cases requiring public interest standing—have the ability to remedy the problem 
themselves through a constitutional amendment. 
 164 Pozen, supra note 80, at 278, 290 (classifying these dual concerns as (1) the 
“majoritarian difficulty,” or how elections may influence judges’ decision making at a 
systematic level; and (2) “favoritism,” or how private interests may influence decision 
making at a particularized level).  
 165 Id. at 283 (“If these unelected judges do not have life tenure—as they do in only one 
state—and do not face a scrupulously apolitical reappointment authority, they too may face 
majoritarian pressures related to the likelihood of retaining their post.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 166 Erwin Chemerinsky, Evaluating Judicial Candidates, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1985, 1988 
(1988) (“[T]he entire concept of the rule of law requires that judges decide cases based on 
their views of the legal merits, not based on what will please voters.”). 
 167 Ironically, public interest standing requires the court to go beyond standing and 
debate, to some extent, the merits of the case itself. Although the court does not need to 
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Public interest standing will inevitably lead to litigation focusing solely on 
expanding standing doctrine, or bogged down for years in arguments over 
standing without ever reaching the merits. Perhaps the biggest complaint with 
the court system is the slow, drawn-out nature of litigation. Timetables are 
extended when lawyers spend years arguing whether an issue is “important 
enough” to warrant reaching its merits. Stricter standing requirements 
encourage judicial efficiency and limit frivolous lawsuits. It is surely no 
coincidence that as court dockets become more crowded, many state court 
systems have joined a trend of reeling in or limiting the bounds of public 
interest standing.168 State courts should keep with this pattern, and follow the 
sound reasoning of the federal court system, in keeping with essential judicial 
principles such as separation of powers, judicial independence, and judicial 
efficiency. 
VI. CONCLUSION  
Public interest standing is a compelling concept, one that appeals to 
plaintiffs’ attorneys, activist groups (and judges), and political parties, among 
others. Even more so, it appeals to notions of fairness and the public’s view that 
the court system exists to solve disputes. However, the inapplicability of the 
Federal Constitution to states should not be viewed as a directive to 
intentionally deviate from the contours of the federal court system’s approach to 
standing doctrine. The federal system adheres strictly to the case-or-controversy 
requirement, which limits federal courts’ jurisdiction to situations where parties 
have a genuine dispute and a specific injury so the courts can offer redress. 
Federal courts thus completely reject public interest standing, which by 
definition exists only in the absence of an actual injury. 
Differences between federal and state court systems could support an 
alternative view of standing. States are not bound by the Federal Constitution, 
and most state constitutions do not have a similar case-or-controversy 
requirement. Additionally, judicial elections (and therefore judicial 
accountability), along with the malleability of state law, suggest that the 
judiciary should play a more active role in states’ tripartite system of 
government. 
                                                                                                                       
actually rule on the merits to confer public interest standing, it does need to decide the 
magnitude the case’s impact—which requires some inquiry into the merits. 
 168 See, e.g., State ex rel. Reed v. Neb. Game & Parks Comm’n, 773 N.W.2d 349, 355 
(Neb. 2009) (“Other than challenges to the unauthorized or illegal expenditure of public 
funds[, i.e. taxpayer standing], our more recent cases have narrowed such exceptions to 
situations where matters of great public concern are involved.”). Compare State ex rel. 
Howard v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 614 P.2d 45, 52 (Okla. 1980) (allowing public interest 
standing to enforce public duty), with Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 5 v. Spry, 292 P.3d 19, 20 (Okla. 
2012) (applying a more restrictive, traditional doctrine of standing to dismiss an action 
challenging the constitutionality of a legislative enactment). 
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However, upon closer examination, the rationales supporting public interest 
standing are unconvincing. The checks and balances of tripartite government, as 
well as the electoral accountability of the other branches (and, in certain states, 
the judiciary), demonstrate that adequate means already exist to ensure that 
public officials fulfill their duties. Similarly, the conclusion that the court must 
grant standing to a party without it just to ensure somebody can challenge an 
action incorrectly assumes all constitutional challenges are legitimate, and 
absurdly creates standing only because it does not exist in the first place. 
Finally, the concept of a nominal injury illustrates the true heart of public 
interest standing: by definition, a party has an injury or it does not, and nominal 
injuries are (as the adjective suggests) merely an excuse to grant standing in 
cases courts deem “important enough” to adjudicate. 
State courts must address public interest standing head-on. Too many states 
remain silent or, more problematically, have inconsistent or contradictory 
jurisprudence on public interest standing. State courts should draw on principles 
from the federal system to either reject public interest standing entirely or curb 
its use. Specifically, the reasoning underlying the case-or-controversy 
requirement is transferable to state courts.  
Public interest standing equates to the judiciary expanding its own power, 
often at the expense of the political process or another branch of government. 
Considering the political accountability of the other branches and the 
malleability of state law, the people have the power and the ability to enact 
changes and challenge government action without requiring (or allowing) courts 
to meddle. This aligns with the view of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
as well as numerous state supreme courts, that it is inappropriate for the 
judiciary to issue advisory opinions or serve as a forum for general grievances. 
Finally, limiting public interest standing furthers judicial efficiency, as more 
time will be spent litigating the merits of cases rather than attempting to identify 
which cases are “important enough” to warrant adjudication. 
The pillars of public interest standing are tenuous at best, constituting the 
manifestation of courts with a disposition to activism and advisory roles. 
Although public interest standing is far too prevalent and common to be 
completely eliminated, the implications of its use are discomforting and the 
consequences upon a heavily-taxed and oft-questioned judiciary should lead 
state courts to revisit, reevaluate, and ultimately reign in their standing doctrine.
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: Fifty-State Survey of Public Interest Standing 
  
State Form Case(s) 
Alabama No Public Interest Standing 
Ex parte Ala. Educ. Television 
Comm’n, 2013 WL 5394359 (Ala. 
Jan. 24, 2014) 
Alaska Most Appropriate Litigant 
Baxley v. State, 958 P.2d 422 
(Alaska 1998) 
Arizona 
Enforcement of Public 
Duties and Challenges 
of Constitutionality 
Sears v. Hull, 961 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 
1998) 
Arkansas No Public Interest Standing 
Springdale Sch. Dist. No. 50 v. 
The Evans Law Firm, P.A., 200 
S.W.3d 917 (Ark. 2005) 
California 
Enforcement of Public 
Duties and Challenges 
of Constitutionality 
Save the Plastic Bag Coal. v. City 
of Manhattan Beach, 254 P.3d 
1005 (Cal. 2011) 
Colorado 
Enforcement of Public 
Duties and Challenges 
of Constitutionality 
Barber v. Ritter, 196 P.3d 238 
(Colo. 2008) 
Connecticut No Public Interest Standing 
West Farms Mall, LLC v. Town of 
West Hartford, 901 A.2d 649 
(Conn. 2006) 
Delaware No Public Interest Standing 
Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. 
Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 
A.2d 892 (Del. 1994) 
Florida No Public Interest Standing 
Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., 
Inc. v. Clark, 668 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 
1996) 
Georgia 
Enforcement of Public 
Duties and Challenges 
of Constitutionality 
Rothschild v. Columbus Consol. 
Gov’t, 678 S.E.2d 76 (Ga. 2009) 
Hawaii Nominal Injury Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Transp., 167 P.3d 292 (Haw. 2007) 
Idaho No Public Interest Standing 
Young v. City of Ketchum, 44 
P.3d 1157 (Idaho 2002) 
Illinois No Public Interest Standing 
Cnty. of Cook ex rel. Rifkin v. 
Bear Stearns & Co., 831 N.E.2d 
563 (Ill. 2005) 
Indiana 
Enforcement of Public 
Duties and Challenges 
of Constitutionality 
State ex rel. Cittadine v. Ind. Dep’t 
of Transp., 790 N.E.2d 978 (Ind. 
2003) 
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State Form Case(s)
Iowa No Public Interest Standing 
Godfrey v. State, 752 N.W.2d 413 
(Iowa 2008) (suggesting that, 
although the Supreme Court of 
Iowa has not yet done so, it would 
be willing to confer public interest 
standing) 
Kansas 
Enforcement of Public 
Duties and Challenges 
of Constitutionality 
State ex rel. Morrison v. Sebelius, 
179 P.3d 366 (Kan. 2008) 
Kentucky No Public Interest Standing 
Bailey v. Preserve Rural Roads of 
Madison Cnty., Inc., 394 S.W.3d 
350 (Ky. 2011) 
Louisiana No Public Interest Standing 
State v. Williams, 94 So. 3d 770 
(La. 2012) 
Maine No Public Interest Standing 
Lindeman v. Comm’n on Gov’t 
Ethics and Election Practices, 961 
A.2d 538 (Me. 2008) 
Maryland No Public Interest Standing 
Kendall v. Howard Cnty., 66 A.3d 
684 (Md. 2013) 
Massachusetts 
Enforcement of Public 
Duties and Challenges 
of Constitutionality 
Tax Equity Alliance for Mass. v. 
Comm’r of Revenue, 672 N.E.2d 
504 (Mass. 1996) 
Michigan Most Appropriate Litigant 
Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n v. 
Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 
686 (Mich. 2010) 
Minnesota No Public Interest Standing 
State ex rel. Humphrey v. Philip 
Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490 
(Minn. 1996) 
Mississippi No Public Interest Standing 
City of Picayune v. S. Reg’l Corp., 
916 So. 2d 510 (Miss. 2005) 
Missouri No Public Interest Standing 
Manzara v. State, 343 S.W.3d 656 
(Mo. 2011) 
Montana 
Enforcement of Public 
Duties and Challenges 
of Constitutionality 
Comm. for an Effective Judiciary 
v. State, 679 P.2d 1223 (Mont. 
1984) 
Nebraska Most Appropriate Litigant 
State ex rel. Reed v. State, Game 
and Parks Comm’n, 773 N.W.2d 
2349 (Neb. 2009) 
Nevada No Public Interest Standing 
Heller v. Legislature of State of 
Nev., 93 P.3d 746 (Nev. 2004) 
New 
Hampshire 
No Public Interest 
Standing 
Asmussen v. Comm’s, N.H. Dep’t 
of Safety, 766 A.2d 678 (N.H. 
2011) 
762 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 76:3 
 
State Form Case(s)
New Jersey Nominal Injury Jen Electric, Inc. v. Cnty. of Essex, 964 A.2d 790 (N.J. 2009) 
New Mexico 
Enforcement of Public 
Duties and Challenges 
of Constitutionality 
New Energy Economy, Inc. v. 
Martinez, 247 P.3d 286 (N.M. 
2011) 
New York No Public Interest Standing 
Soc’y of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. 
Cnty. of Suffolk, 573 N.E.2d 1034 
(N.Y. 1991) 
North 
Carolina Nominal Injury 
Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 
599 S.E.2d 365 (N.C. 2004) 
North Dakota No Public Interest Standing 
N.D. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. 
Peterson, 625 N.W.2d 551 (N.D. 
2001) 
Ohio 
Enforcement of Public 
Duties and Challenges 
of Constitutionality 
State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial 
Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 
1062 (1999) 
Oklahoma 
Enforcement of Public 
Duties and Challenges 
of Constitutionality 
 
State ex rel. Howard v. Okla. Corp. 
Comm’n, 614 P.2d 45 (Okla. 1980) 
 
Oregon 
Enforcement of Public 
Duties and Challenges 
of Constitutionality 
Kellas v. Dep’t of Corrections, 145 
P.3d 139 (Or. 2006) (public interest 
standing provided for by statute) 
Pennsylvania Most Appropriate Litigant 
In re Hickson, 821 A.2d 1238 (Pa. 
2003); Sprague v. Casey, 550 A.2d 
184 (Pa. 1988) 
Rhode Island No Public Interest Standing 
Haviland v. Simmons, 45 A.3d 
1246 (R.I. 2012) 
South 
Carolina 
Enforcement of Public 
Duties and Challenges 
of Constitutionality 
Sloan v. Wilkins, 608 S.E.2d 579 
(S.C. 2005) 
South Dakota 
Enforcement of Public 
Duties and Challenges 
of Constitutionality 
Stumes v. Bloomberg, 551 N.W.2d 
590 (S.D. 1996) 
Tennessee No Public Interest Standing 
City of Chattanooga v. Davis, 54 
S.W.3d 248 (Tenn. 2001) 
Texas No Public Interest Standing 
Andrade v. Venable, 372 S.W.3d 
134 (Tex. 2012); Bland Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 
2000) 
Utah Most Appropriate Litigant 
Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 
1098 (Utah 2013) 
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State Form Case(s) 
Vermont No Public Interest Standing 
Franklin Cnty. Sheriff’s Office v. 
St. Albans City Police Dep’t, 58 
A.3d 207 (Vt. 2012) 
Virginia 
Enforcement of Public 
Duties and Challenges 
of Constitutionality 
Hertz v. Times-World Corp., 528 
S.E.2d 458 (Va. 2000) 
Washington Most Appropriate Litigant 
Grant Cnty. Fire Prot. Dist. No. 5 
v. City of Moses Lake, 83 P.3d 419 
(Wash. 2004) 
West Virginia No Public Interest Standing 
State ex rel. Billy Ray C. v. Skaff, 
438 S.E.2d 847 (W. Va. 1993) 
Wisconsin Nominal Injury McConkey v. Van Hollen, 783 N.W.2d 855 (Wis. 2010) 
Wyoming 
Enforcement of Public 
Duties and Challenges 
of Constitutionality 
Jolley v. State Loan & Inv. Bd., 38 
P.3d 1073 (Wyo. 2002) 
 
 
 
 

